Southern Methodist University

SMU Scholar
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2008

Marilyn Monroe’s Legacy: Taxation of Postmortem Publicity
Rights
Joshua C. Tate
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law

Recommended Citation
Joshua C. Tate, Marilyn Monroe’s Legacy: Taxation of Postmortem Publicity Rights,118 Yale L.J. Pocket
Part 38 (2008)

This document is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of SMU
Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

the yale law journal pocket part

118:38

2008

Joshua C. Tate

Marilyn Monroe’s Legacy: Taxation of Postmortem
Publicity Rights
In an April 2008 essay in The Yale Law Journal Pocket Part, Mitchell Gans,
Bridget Crawford, and Jonathan Blattmachr argue that recent state legislation
recognizing postmortem publicity rights fails to take into account the likely
estate tax consequences.1 Although Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr are correct
to argue that allowing publicity rights to pass by will or inheritance could have
adverse tax consequences for some estates, those ramifications are not as farreaching as might be imagined. Moreover, their “legislative solution” will not
solve the problem.
Over the past few decades, courts and legislatures in most states have
recognized a celebrity’s right of publicity as a property interest that may survive
his or her death.2 California recently amended its 1985 statute so that it now
makes publicity rights retroactively devisable for all who have died since 1915.3
Legislation to similar effect is currently pending in New York.4 These statutes
allow the devisees of bygone celebrities such as Marilyn Monroe to profit
whenever others use images of the deceased. Litigation over Monroe’s estate
seems to have been a primary impetus for the California legislation.5
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Mitchell M. Gans, Bridget J. Crawford & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Postmortem Rights of
Publicity: The Federal Estate Tax Consequences of New State-Law Property Rights, 117 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 203 (2008).
See David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 71, 83-84 (2005).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p) (West Supp. 2008). If the will designates no specific
beneficiary, the right of publicity passes through the residuary or by intestacy. Id. §
3344.1(b), (d).
S. 6005, 2007 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
See Matthew Belloni, Marilyn, Money Fueling Right of Publicity Battle, Sept. 14, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/entertainmentNews/idUSN1424817820070914.
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Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr fear that, because publicity rights will be
part of the celebrity’s gross estate at death, the tax due may exceed the value of
the other assets. Forcing heirs or devisees to liquidate other assets to pay the
tax will allegedly compel them to seek the greatest financial benefit from the
publicity right. As a solution to this supposed tax catastrophe, these authors
suggest that states designate specific statutory heirs regardless of the celebrity’s
wishes. Analogizing from wrongful death benefits, they contend that if the
celebrity lacks the authority to determine who receives the publicity rights,
those rights will be exempt from estate tax. To give some flexibility to
celebrities, however, Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr would allow them to
destroy rights of publicity inter vivos, allegedly without negative estate tax
consequences.6

I. taxation of retroactive publicity rights

Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr lead their piece by discussing the recent
California legislation and its application to long-deceased celebrities like
Monroe, which might lead a reader to infer that taxation of publicity rights has
some relevance to Monroe’s estate. The authors do not, however, discuss the
status of publicity rights at Monroe’s death or the applicable statute of
limitations, both of which make it unlikely that the estate tax will be applied in
Monroe’s case.
Although the term “right of publicity” was coined in 1953, it took more
than a decade for courts to recognize publicity rights as property.7 In 1962, the
year Monroe died, the Second Circuit squarely faced the question of whether a
right of publicity was a property interest for federal tax purposes, and
answered in the negative.8 In the years following this case, however, courts
began to accept publicity rights as property.9 Yet the issue of postmortem
transmission remained unsettled for decades.10 If the ability to transmit to heirs
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A similar argument has been made before. See Note, Federal Estate Tax and the Right of
Publicity: Taxing Estates for Celebrity Value, 108 HARV. L. REV. 683, 697-700 (1995).
See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953);
Westfall & Landau, supra note 2, at 76-89.
Miller v. Comm’r, 299 F.2d 706, 709-10 (2d Cir. 1962).
Westfall & Landau, supra note 2, at 80-86.
See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 960 (6th Cir. 1980); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979).
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or devisees is an important stick in the bundle of rights that constitutes
“property,”11 publicity rights were not property at the time of Monroe’s death.
The federal gross estate values property “to the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death.”12 At the time of Monroe’s
death, she had no property interest, or at least no descendible or devisable
interest, in a publicity right. Given that Monroe’s executor could not have
foreseen a law enacted more than four decades later, moreover, the statute of
limitations would bar the IRS from collecting estate tax now unless the
executor failed to file a return.13 Money received from capitalizing on Monroe’s
image today should, of course, be subject to income tax,14 but estate tax cannot
be collected.
The estate tax disaster predicted by Gans, Crawford and Blattmachr,
therefore, is unlikely to arise in the retroactive context covered by the new
California amendments. Indeed, the authors do not go so far as to assert that
the government will levy taxes on the estates of persons who died years ago.
They do claim, however, that the government could do so when celebrities die
in the future. Yet their proposed reform is not likely to solve this latter
problem, nor is it clear that the problem will be as widespread as they imply.

II. wrongful death benefits: a flawed analogy

In arguing that legislatures should eliminate the power to devise publicity
rights, Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr draw an analogy to wrongful death
claims, which are not considered part of the gross estate. “[I]f postmortem
publicity rights pass only to specific individuals designated by statute and not
by the decedent,” the authors argue, “then the value of those rights should not
be included in the decedent’s gross estate, by analogy to wrongful death
benefits.”15 This argument, however, misconstrues the reasons for excluding
wrongful death benefits from the gross estate.
The rationale for excluding wrongful death benefits was set forth in the
1972 case of Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, which held that

11.
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13.

14.
15.

See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
I.R.C. § 2033 (2000).
The limitations period is three years, id. § 6501(a), or six in the event of a “substantial
omission,” id. § 6501(e). If no return was filed, however, the IRS might still be able to
collect today. Id. § 6501(c)(3).
Id. § 61(a)(3).
Gans, Crawford & Blattmachr, supra note 1, at 208.
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because “there was no property interest in the decedent which passed by virtue
of his death, but rather one which arose after his death, such an interest is not
property owned at death and not part of the gross estate.”16 Wrongful death
benefits were excluded from the gross estate not because the decedent lacked
the power to devise them: in fact, the decedent did have such a power under
state law.17 Rather, the court excluded them because they arose only at the
decedent’s death, and did not belong to the decedent during life.18 Prior to
Connecticut Bank, the IRS treated wrongful death benefits as nontaxable only
when the relevant statute was thought to deny the decedent a lifetime property
interest in the proceeds.19
A celebrity is entitled to his or her publicity rights, unlike wrongful death
benefits, during life. Eliminating a celebrity’s testamentary power over
publicity rights does not change the fact that he or she enjoyed a property
interest in them at the time of death. Thus, the analogy to wrongful death
benefits does not support the elimination of the power to devise publicity
rights. Moreover, if legislatures follow the suggestion of Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr and grant celebrities a lifetime power to destroy their rights of
publicity, a choice not to destroy is hard to distinguish from a devise to the
designated heirs, which would certainly be taxable.20 If the argument of these
authors had merit, parents in Louisiana would be able to avoid estate tax on
property passing to their children under age twenty-four, who are protected
from disinheritance to the extent of the legitime.21 A testamentary disposition is
no less taxable when it is compelled by statute.22
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465 F.2d 760, 763 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 764.
See also Rev. Rul. 75-127, 1975-1 C.B. 297, 298 (stating the Service’s intent not to press the
issue further).
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-8, 1969-1 C.B. 219, 219 (“The decedent in his lifetime never had an
interest in either the right of action or the proceeds.”); Rev. Rul. 56-637, 1956-2 C.B. 600,
600 (same); Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179, 180 (same).
Even if the right to destroy is exercised, the government might still attempt to collect estate
tax. See Ray D. Madoff, Taxing Personhood: Estate Taxes and the Compelled Commodification of
Identity, 17 VA. TAX REV. 759, 788-89 (1998).
LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1493 (2008). The legitime is not covered by
I.R.C. § 2034 (2000), which deals with interests of the surviving spouse.
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 8651001 (Aug. 8, 1986) (“Because property is required to pass by
state law does not require that a downward adjustment in value take place.”).
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III. conclusion

Whether states should recognize a devisable right of publicity is a difficult
policy question. Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr correctly point out that the
federal estate tax may interfere with the plans of some celebrities who seek to
devise their publicity rights to noncharitable devisees. It is unlikely, however,
that the estate tax will affect the estates of celebrities who died long ago, and
depriving future celebrities of the power to devise will not necessarily prevent
or discourage the IRS from collecting the tax, especially if the celebrities retain
a lifetime power to destroy. Moreover, the Hobson’s choice presented to
celebrities by Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr may conflict with the policy
reasons for recognizing a right of publicity in the first place.23 In any event, if
publicity rights are devised outright to the surviving spouse, they will be
exempt from estate tax until the spouse’s death because of the marital
deduction,24 and the publicity rights of the typical celebrity (as opposed to a
timeless icon like Monroe) may not remain valuable for many years after his or
her death. The specter of federal death taxes should not frighten state
legislatures into imposing unnecessary restrictions on testamentary freedom.
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I intend to develop this point in a future article.
I.R.C. § 2056.
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